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BANK FINANCING OF HOSTILE ACQUISITIONS
OF CORPORATE LOAN CUSTOMERS
A special relation of trust and confidence, and the duties attendant thereto, arises
when a commercial bank conditions a loan upon access to confidential proprietary
information of a prospective customer. A serious conflict may develop !f the bank
laterfinances a tender offerfor the stock of thisprior loan customer. In the context
of a hostile takeover, a target corporation may seek to defend by barring thefinanc-
ing upon the ground that the bank has improperly employed this proprietary data in
evaluating the propitiousness offinancing the tender offer. Two recent cases have
concluded that a bank should not be absolutely precluded fromfinancing the take-
over of a customer. This Note analyzes three theories which could support afinding
of a bank's liabilityfor breach offiduciary duty. The liability analysis also includes a
demonstration of the applicability of the antideceptionpro visions ofthefederalsecur-
ities laws, along with an analysis of a possible "Chinese wall" defense by the bank.
Finally, the Note advocates thepropriety of injunctive relief until such time as legisla-
tive enactments balance the rights and obligations of the parties.
INTRODUCTION
THE ACCEPTANCE of the hostile takeover as a legitimate
method of corporate expansion has spawned the development
of sophisticated acquisition tactics and a corollary evolution of
target management defense strategies. If target management de-
termines that a takeover is not in the best interests of the com-
pany, its initial objective will be to forestall the pending offer.
This Note will focus on one of the many defensive devices avail-
able to management-an effort to restrict the offeror's means of
financing the takeover.'
Recently, litigation has tested the conflict of interest which ap-
pears to arise when a bank finances the hostile takeover of a target
with which it has a pre-existing relationship. A major commercial
bank which engages in tender offer financing is now confronted
with a quandary when contemplating whether to participate in the
takeover of one of its corporate borrowers. No statutory law di-
rectly regulates this practice, and the limited case law which has
developed is conflicting.2 Because of this void, target companies
I. See generally Herzel & Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers: The Bank's
Legal Problems, 96 BANKING L.J. 676 (1979); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the
Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 882 (1978).
2. In Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979), the only
appellate court to address this issue directly noted that legislative concern is present and
may soon result in some statutory direction.
[T]here is every reason to believe that Congress is aware of this issue and has
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defending against a tender offer supported by a bank with which
they have an established relationship may perceive this relation-
ship as a starting point for their defense.
Both Chemical Bank and Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Company have recently found themselves subject to lit-
igation that questioned their roles in financing tender offers di-
rected to loan customers: Chemical Bank in Washington Steel v.
TW Corp. I and Continental in American Medicorp v. Continental
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 4 These two controversies are the
primary bases for the existing case law on the subject.
The two cases presented virtually identical factual settings
which, stated in general terms, established a model for the discus-
sion in this Note:
A major commercial bank established a lending relationship
with a corporation5 which became the object of a hostile take-
over by means of a cash tender offer. In the course of this lend-
ing relationship, the bank received a package of financial
materials from the target-borrower. Much of the transmitted
information, notably projections of future earnings and devel-
opment plans prepared by the borrower, was confidential or
nonpublic.6 After the creation of this lending arrangement be-
tween the bank and the target corporation, the bank agreed to
participate in the financing of a tender offer for the shares of
the target's stock by another corporation. The decision to par-
ticipate in this financing was allegedly made in part on an eval-
uation of the target's financial picture through the use of the
confidential or nonpublic information supplied to the bank by
the target-borrower in connection with the unrelated prior
begun the difficult process of effecting a legislative solution. In addition, the
Comptroller of the Currency has recently proposed a regulation for national
banks which suggests ways of restricting the use of confidential information ob-
tained from one client on behalf of another. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 9.7(d),
42 Fed. Reg. 56,338 (1977) .... The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System has adopted a similar statement for state member banks. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,755 (1978). . . . These developments evince a concern at the national
level with the issues raised by Washington.
Id at 601.
3. 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
4. 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
5. Continental Bank and American Medicorp had arranged a $12.3 million loan and
were in the process of structuring an additional $11.4 million agreement. Hearing Tran-
script at 48, American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F.
Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Chemical Bank and Washington Steel Corp. had an established
lending relationship whereby Chemical agreed to lend an amount up to $2.25 million as
one of three banks participating in a total loan program of $10 million. Washington Steel
Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d at 596.
6. See generally Brief of Appellee at 4-5, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
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loans.7 It was not claimed that the bank directly transferred
any of the nonpublic information to the offeror. After the sec-
ond lending relationship was established, a tender offer was
made to the target's shareholders. Litigation was initiated
before any shares were tendered in response to the offer.
The judicial response to this factual setting has been varied.
Judge Simmons in the trial court opinion in Washington Steel
held that, under these circumstances, a bank is an agent of its cor-
porate borrower and has a duty not to act adversely to the inter-
ests of that borrower. Additionally, the bank has a duty to
disclose all relevant facts pertaining to this "dual agency relation-
ship" so that the target may make an informed choice regarding
whether to continue the relationship.8
Judge Gibbons, writing for a unanimous court in the appellate
decision in Washington Steel, reversed the findings of Judge Sim-
mons and held that a bank is not precluded from financing a hos-
tile takeover of its corporate customer. In dicta, the court
suggested that a bank does not violate any duty to a borrower in
connection with its decision to lend to a second customer.9 Judge
Gibbons premised his notion that banks are not prohibited from
using such confidential information on the policy that banks
should be permitted to use all available information in evaluating
a prospective loan customer.' 0
Judge McMillen's trial court opinion inAmerican Medicorp re-
flects a different approach in holding that a bank is not totally
precluded from financing a hostile tender offer for the shares of its
corporate borrower. " Finding no improper use or dissemination
of the confidential information received from the target, he con-
cluded that so long as such information is not relied upon when
deciding to finance a takeover, the bank is free to deal with any
other borrower. Both Judge Gibbons and Judge McMillen
grounded their holdings on the belief that the per se breach of
fiduciary duty urged by the targets would unduly constrict bank
7. In American Medicorp, there was no allegation of misuse of the confidential infor-
mation, 475 F. Supp. at 7. In Washington Steel, the court found no misuse of such infor-
mation, 602 F.2d at 602.
8. Judge Simmons found an additional breach in Chemical Bank's "overtly and ac-
tively directing its employees to conceal" this relationship from the target, Washington
Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
9. 602 F.2d at 603.
10. Id
11. 475 F. Supp. at 8.
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financing and the flow of commerce.12
These diverse judicial responses draw attention to the need for
thorough analysis and, possibly, legislative action."3 Bankers are
concerned about the potential for burdensome litigation and ad-
verse publicity. 4 As one commentator has described the banks'
view of tender offer loans: "The institutional lender is essentially
a civilian among combatants in a war zone. It makes no en-
trepreneurial profits from a takeover and essentially all it wants to
do is get repaid its loan and not have the regular course of its
business interrupted."' 5 In a letter to the Chairman of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, then Federal
Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller also expressed con-
cern:
[Although] there are no Federal bank laws specifically regulat-
ing bank loans to facilitate corporate takeovers ... the misuse
of confidential information by a bank in a proposed corporate
takeover could be viewed as an unsafe or unsound banking
practice if such misuse exposed the bank to legal liability or
damaged the bank's reputation, resulting in a loss of public
confidence. 1
6
For their part, practitioners involved in orchestrating acquisi-
tions or in defending against them are more concerned with the
strategic import of the state of the law. Time is a crucial element
in a tender offer. Counsel for acquiring firms naturally resist the
development of a new defense tactic by a target effectively pre-
cluding tender offer financing through the arrangement of a series
of loans from major banks,'7 or raising sufficient legal questions to
obtain a preliminary injunction.'" Target corporations, on the
12. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d at 601; American Medicorp v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. at 10.
13. See generally Hearings on Regulation under Federal Banking and Securities Laws of
Persons Involved in Corporate Takeovers Before the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Hearings on Financial Institutions and the Na-
tion's Economy Before the Subcomm on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm on Banking Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); Legal Times of Washington, March 26, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
14. See Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 1; Legal Times of Washington, supra note 13.
15. Potter, Financing and Other Aspects of Cash Tender Offers-A Panel- The Role of
the Commercial Bank, 32 Bus. LAW. 1415 (1977).
16. Letter from G. William Miller to Chairman of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, quoted in Legal Times of Washington, supra note 13.
17. Legal Times of Washington, supra note 13; Comment, Bank Financing of Hostile
Takeovers of Borrowers: Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 93 HARv. L. REv. 440,
444-45 (1979).
18. Legal Times of Washington, supra note 13; Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at
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other hand, are concerned about the unfair competitive advantage
that may be gained by an offeror solely through its choice of lend-
ing institution.
At its core, the problem is one of balancing a number of con-
siderations: the interest of the target corporation in maintaining
the integrity of its proprietary information and business objec-
tives, the goals of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, and the recognized need for readily available bank financ-
ing. The purpose of this Note is to set forth an analytical frame-
work of the problem. In order to ascertain the nature of a bank's
obligations it will be necessary to examine both the policies that
underlie the relationship between a bank and its corporate bor-
rower and the expectations of the parties when they enter a lend-
ing agreement.
Working from the model factual setting provided by Washing-
ton Steel and American Medicorp,19 four general theories of bank
liability will be addressed: a per se breach of the relationship be-
tween a bank and its corporate borrower,2" a breach of the bank-
borrower relationship by appropriation of confidential informa-
tion,21 a breach of the bank-borrower relationship by indirect dis-
closure of confidential information, 22 and liability for selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information under the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.23 This fourth issue was
not raised in either the Washington Steel or the American
Medicorp case, but is an analogous application of federal securi-
ties regulation to the same incidents which give rise to a common
law action. Liability of the offeror under these categories will also
be examined where appropriate. The Note concludes that while
the target of a takeover may seek injunctive relief under either the
federal securities laws or the common law, a proper balancing of
the rights of the parties to a hostile takeover can be carried out
only through special legislation or regulation.
I. CREATION OF A SPECIAL OR FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN A BANK AND ITS CORPORATE LOAN
CUSTOMER
Historically, the relationship between a bank and its borrower
19. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
20. See notes 35-55 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 56-102 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 103-20 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 121-83 infra and accompanying text.
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has been viewed as a debtor-creditor agreement with few obliga-
tions placed upon the bank beyond the express terms of the loan.24
It is now well established, however, that contemporary loan trans-
actions between a lender and its customer may give rise to more
extensive duties,25 which are commensurate with the degree of
trust and confidence placed in the bank by its client. A customer
does not rely on a bank to counsel it on every material fact relat-
ing to its business or finances when it is only a depositor.26 Never-
theless, a special or fiduciary relationship may be created when
the customer relies on the bank as a financial advisor 27 or estab-
lishes a course of dealing in which nonpublic information con-
cerning its finances or objectives is transmitted to the bank in
confidence.28 The form of this relationship has been variously la-
beled as fiduciary,29 agencys° or implied contract,3 ' but whatever
the label, it is the mutual understanding and reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties that define the nature of their dealings and give
rise to their obligations.
A corporation and its banker often develop longstanding ties,
for a lending arrangement is particularly conducive to substantial
interaction. The size and complexity of capital development loans
necessitates cooperation between the two entities over an extended
period of time. Moreover, major loans to corporations involve a
profound analysis of repayment feasibility. Accordingly, banks
request or require certain financial data from the corporate cus-
tomer as a precondition to the loan. In the course of an estab-
lished relationship, the bank will accumulate a great deal of
information about the internal workings, status and objectives of a
24. See generally Hagedorn, Fiduciary Aspects of the Bank-Customer Relationship, 54
Mo. BANKING J. 406 (1978).
25. See notes 32-33 infra.
26. See, e.g., Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972).
27. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); Pigg v. Robert-
son, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). Cf. Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of
Rochester, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d 218 (1976) (indicating that even though the plaintiff
had relied on the defendant bank as a financial counselor, the plaintif's ability as an exper-
ienced businessman negated the fiduciary character of the relationship).
28. See Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); M.L. Stewart & Co.,
Inc. v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
29. Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Rochester, 307 Minn. 487, 238 N.W.2d
218 (1976); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1977); M.L. Stewart & Co., Inc.
v. Marcus, 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
30. Spratlin, Harrington & Thomas, Inc. v. Hawn, 116 Ga. App. 175 (1967); Peterson
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
31. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Milohnich
v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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corporation, much of which is confidential or nonpublic. 32  Be-
cause of the sensitive nature of these materials and the mutual
recognition of their confidentiality, it is understood that the infor-
mation will not be disseminated to persons outside the relation-
ship for purposes other than a valid business interest of the
corporation.33 In this manner, a special relationship of confidence
is created with regard to the information transmitted.
Yet, the bank's fiduciary duties may go beyond this minimal
construction: the obligations are established by the express or im-
plied agreement between the bank and its customer. The courts
that have considered this relationship in the context of financing a
hostile takeover have recognized the existence of some special re-
lationship between a bank and its corporate borrower, but have
differed on the degree and nature of the bank's obligations.34
32. However, one court has drawn attention to the question of whether the materials
that are transmitted to a bank by a prospective borrower are truly "confidential." The issue
is one of incremental disclosure. As confidential information is transmitted to other entities
such as accountants for tax purposes, attorneys for legal counseling, financial consultants,
and to some extent material suppliers for credit evaluation, the dissemination lessens the
nonpublic nature of the information. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. 5, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The relevance of this dissemination to
a potential breach of a confidential relationship by the bank is questionable. It is the un-
derstanding of the parties to the relationship and not the nature of the material which
ultimately determines the violation. See text accompanying notes 61-67 infra; Note, Bank
Financing of Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: 4 Breach of a Fiduciary Duty?,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827, 836 (1978).
The issue of the "qualifiedly confidential" nature of the materials may be a more signif-
icant question in determining materiality under federal securities law. See the discussion
of materiality in text accompanying notes 121-23 infra. See also Herzel & Rosenberg,
supra note 1, at 678 for a discussion of a bank's ability to show nonmateriality in litigation.
33. See Hagedorn, supra note 24, at 410-11. Information contained in depositor ac-
counts is subject to the same nondisclosure protection. See Milobnich v. First Nat'l Bank
of Miami Springs, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961). For a discussion of this point in connection with
federal securities law, see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11374, [197421975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,167 (Commission's view that projections on future
corporate earnings, transmitted in the context of a confidential relationship for a valid busi-
ness purpose of the issuer, should not be selectively disclosed).
34. The district court opinion in Washington Steel found an agency relationship ex-
isted. 465 F. Supp. at 1103. The appellate court's position on the issue of the existence of a
special relationship is less clear, but its denunciation of the district court's interpretation of
the duty owed by the bank as too sweeping implicitly recognizes the existence of a nar-
rower duty. 602 F.2d at 599. The court in American Medicorp implied that a bank's reli-
ance on the confidential information of one borrower in connection with a loan to a second
borrower would breach the special relationship. 475 F. Supp. at 8. In a case arising from
the same set of facts, Judge Lasker cited Judge McMillen's American Medicorp opinion as
expressly recognizing a fiduciary relationship and agreed with that conclusion:
Wle share the view of Judge McMillen, expressed in the transcript of the
Medicorp-Continental case before him on December 5, 1977, that a special rela-
[Vol. 31:132
FINANCING HOSTILE ACQUISITIONS
A. Scope of Duties: Per Se Breach of Fiduciary Obligations of a
Bank to its Corporate Borrower by Financing a Hostile
Takeover
In both the Washington Steel and American Medicorp contro-
versies, the target company contended that a bank breached a
fiduciary duty to its corporate borrower by the act of financing the
hostile acquisition of that borrower:35  participation in the take-
over of a customer allegedly placed the lender in a position of
conflict between the protection it owed the interests of the target
and its own pecuniary interest in the earnings which would be
received from the loan to the offeror. Of course, this argument is
premised on the notion that when a bank and a corporate bor-
rower establish a lending arrangement, a fiduciary relationship is
created whereby the bank impliedly agrees to further the best in-
terests of the corporation.3 6 Hence, participation in a hostile take-
over is a per se breach of this agreement.37 A second, related
charge is that in establishing a similar relationship with the offeror
corporation-which has interests directly adverse to the first bor-
rower-an inevitable conflict arises. The basis for this argument
is the general agency theory that a person cannot simultaneously
represent two opposing parties without failing to pursue the best
interests of one of them.3 8 Therefore, a subsequent loan arrange-
ment constitutes a breach of the former arrangement.39
tionship which may be designated fiduciary or confidential, does exist between a
prospective borrower and its bank which should preclude the bank from dissemi-
nating or using the information for improper purposes.
Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,286 at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
35. For a general discussion of bank fiduciary duties, see Hagedorn, supra note 24.
36. Brief of Appellee at 29, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d
Cir. 1979).
37. Brief of Appellee at 14, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d
Cir. 1979). For quintessential statements on the notion of general fiduciary duties, see
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80 (1943).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958).
39. Judge Simmons, in Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1100
(W.D. Pa. 1979), found a breach of the relationship between the bank and its target bor-
rower from the bank's failure to notify the target of the existence of a dual agency relation-
ship. Such a disclosure conceivably could cure the breach of a duty to disclose material
information to the target. Yet, the disclosure would nevertheless breach a duty owing to
the offeror, the offeror would reasonably expect the bank to refrain from such disclosure
because the information supplied to the bank by the offeror in the course of its loan rela-
tionship with the bank is also transmitted with the expectation that this information will
remain confidential. Additionally, the disclosure of an intention to make a tender offer
may have serious "tipping" consequences under the federal securities laws. See note 121
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The application of a per se breach of fiduciary duty necessarily
implies a broad conception of the scope of a banker-borrower re-
lationship. Such a conception, however, is not a necessary inci-
dent of the relationship. In general, unless constrained by statute,
the nature and extent of a fiduciary relationship are determined
by the parties.4" However, absent an express provision in a loan
arrangement which prohibits the bank from dealing with other cli-
ents who may have interests hostile to the borrower, such an un-
derstanding can only be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the agreement.4" If a corporation enters into the loan
arrangement with the presumed understanding that a bank has
existing or potential relationships with many organizations, some
of which will certainly have interests in competition with or ad-
verse to those of the borrowing corporation, its expectations must
be appropriately tailored to the commercial context. A broad pro-
hibition of all action adverse to the interests of the borrower must,
therefore, be based upon some additional circumstances accompa-
nying the loan arrangement.
The scope of a bank's duties to its borrower is defined by the
particular transactions which the relationship encompasses.42
Those courts which have imposed broad duties on a bank have
focused on the special degree of trust or confidence which the cus-
tomer in that particular relationship placed in the lender.43 Un-
infra; SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,374, 18 SEC DOCKET 1092 (Nov. 29, 1979).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 (1958).
41. See Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454,
460 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that no duty exists independent of contract which limits a
bank's ability to lend to competing businesses).
42. The plaintiff, Washington Steel Corp., focused on this point in attempting to argue
that the capital development program that was being financed by the loan from Chemical
Bank would be curtailed if the takeover was completed. Brief of Appellee at 28-29, Wash-
ington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979). See note 44 infra.
43. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated its opinion on the point in Klein v. First
Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972):
We believe the correct rule to be that when a bank transacts business with a
depositor or other customer, it has no special duty to counsel the customer and
inform him of every material fact relating to the transaction. . . unless special
circumstances exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason to know that the
customer is placing his trust and confidence in the bank and is relying on the bank
so to counsel and inform him.
Id at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 623. See also Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d
101 (1937) (special duty of bank when serving as financial counselor); Richfield Bank &
Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976) (duty to disclose insolvency of
one customer to another client when bank has knowledge of possible fraud and special
relationship exists); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (possible duty
of bank personnel to disclose personal interest in subject matter of loan).
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less the degree of trust placed in a bank by the borrower is enough
to make the reasonable expectations of the borrower greater than
those which would normally be understood in this commercial
setting, a bank is free to pursue any relations with parties whose
interests are adverse to the first borrower, so long as the purpose
of the existing loan relationship is not endangered. 4' Thus, to
contend that a bank's relationship with its borrower implied a
general duty not to act adversely to the borrower's interest is to
assume too much. Accordingly, a bank's participation in a hostile
takeover is not, without more, a per se breach of fiduciary duty.
Moreover, a cash tender offer may not be detrimental to a tar-
get corporation.45 A corporation is essentially an aggregation of
the interests of its shareholders, 46 and, when an offer is made, a
shareholder is given an opportunity to obtain a premium for his or
her interest which could not normally be secured in the market-
place. More likely, then, it is the interest of the present target
management which is threatened by a takeover and which pro-
vides the incentive for combat. Using this analysis, if a tender
offer is not adverse to the interests of the shareholders, it may be
argued that no breach of even the purportedly broad fiduciary
duty of a bank occurs by its financing a hostile takeover.
In denouncing the applicability of an absolute prohibition on
banks financing the hostile takeover of a corporate borrower, both
the appellate decision in Washington Steel and the American
Medicorp opinion focused on the practical consequences of recog-
nizing this concept. The paramount consideration of both courts
was that such a ban would "tend to burden the free flow of bank
financing and the ability which a bank now has to deal with cus-
44. When the purpose of the loan is the financing of a corporate program such as
capital development, the bank's obligations would seem to extend to not taking any action
which would proximately injure that program. In Washington Steel it was not shown that
TW Corp. intended the destruction of the target's program as was contended. If such a
curtailment was intended it may have been the acts of new management and not the take-
over which would have resulted in injury to the development program. See Comment,
supra note 17, at 446.
Even if a broad agency relationship is deemed to exist between a bank and its borrower,
an agent is permitted to have more than one principal so long as one relationship does not
compete with or injure another. The comment to § 391 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency notes that an agent may deal with competing parties "if such dealing is not incon-
sistent with his duties to the principal."
45. This issue was not addressed by any of the courts in Washington Steel orAmerican
Medicorp but was raised by Chemical Bank in its brief to the appellate court. Brief of
Appellant at 35-36, Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
46. Id
19801
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tomers who may have adverse interests to other customers."47
From the standpoint of legal precedent, if the per se theory were
recognized, it would be difficult to ascertain circumstances in
which a bank could have any relations with two parties who might
have potentially competing objectives.
The most compelling basis for the per se theory is an applica-
tion of traditional agency concepts as evidenced by the district
court decision in Washington Steel.48 Presumably, a bank would
not be restricted from having depositors who were in competition
with one another,49 for this would fall within the recognized ex-
ception to the dual agency prohibition that an agent may serve
two competing principals if its responsibilities involve only minis-
terial tasks." However, the discretionary character of a lending
relationship goes beyond ministerial tasks." A bank raises suspi-
cions of breached duty when it finances a project for one borrower
and thereby directly contravenes a business objective of the previ-
ously established relationship. It is in just such a situation that
bankers would be reluctant to enter a lending arrangement, and
the flow of bank financing would be restricted. Rather than risk
potential liability for a breach of duty, and more importantly the
legal battle initiated by a disgruntled borrower, a prudent banker
will refrain from lending. This uncertainty would lead to overly
conservative lending decisions.
A second concern stemming from the recognition of an abso-
lute prohibition is the creation of a common law anti-takeover de-
fense.52 ' By arranging for a series of loans from those major banks
which participate in tender offer financing, a company could effec-
tively make itself "takeover-proof': no potential offeror would be
able to obtain the necessary financing.53 Indeed, a similar series
of lending relationships might partially shield a company from or-
dinary competition and enable it to establish a dominant market
47. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d at 601 (citing and agreeing with
Judge McMillen's conclusion in American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 475 F. Supp. at 10).
48. 465 F. Supp. at 1103-05.
49. Banks do, however, have a duty to maintain the confidentiality of a depositor's
account. See note 33 supra.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958).
51. Judge Simmons' opinion failed to clarify precisely what it is about a lending ar-
rangement that gives rise to broad agency duties.
52. Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d at 601.
53. Because of the size of a tender offer loan, only a limited number of banks are
potential sources of financing. Thus, it would not be too difficult for a potential target
company to protect itself in this manner. See Comment, supra note 17, at 444.
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position. The introduction of a new product line or manufactur-
ing concept could be financed through such a network of loans,
thereby restricting potential competitors from securing start-up
capital from the same lending institutions.5 4 Banks would be re-
luctant to finance a company engaging in an enterprise which has
a purpose potentially adverse to that of an existing borrower.
Considering the substantial revision of current banking prac-
tices which would ensue from the recognition of a per se breach,
the courts are prudently hesitant to make a sweeping statement on
the fiduciary duties attendant to a lending relationship. Also,
since common law developments require extensive case by case
refinement, banks would have little guidance in determining
which loans might subject them to liability. Judge Gibbons was
correct when he stated that "establishing a per se common law
fiduciary duty of banks to their borrowers seems archetypically
within the domain of legislative judgement." '
B. The Bank's Appropriation of a Target's Confidential
Information in Evaluating the Loan to the Offeror
A second, more perplexing question is presented when a bank
appropriates and uses the nonpublic information that it has re-
ceived from an established corporate customer in evaluating a
subsequent loan to another corporate borrower. This problem is
compounded when the second borrower intends to use the pro-
ceeds of the loan for the acquisition of the first. Assuming that
there is no direct transmission of the nonpublic information to the
subsequent borrower, the issue is whether such appropriation and
use of proprietary information by the bank constitutes a breach of
its relationship with the target borrower.
The issue was addressed in dicta in both American Medicorp
and Washington Steel.56 Judge Gibbons, in the Washington Steel
appellate opinion, reasoned that, as a matter of policy, internal
use of nonpublic information should be permitted:
To prohibit a bank from considering all available information
in making its own loan decisions might engender one or both of
two undesirable outcomes. First, it might force banks to go
blindly into loan transactions, arguably violating its [sic] duties
to its [sic] own depositors. Alternatively, such a rule might dis-
54. This point was raised by Judge Gibbons in Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp.,
602 F.2d at 601.
55. Id
56. Neither court found actual use of the confidential information.
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courage banks from lending money to any company which ex-
presses an interest in purchasing shares of stock of another of
the bank's customers. The adverse implications of this result
for the free flow of funds is precisely the reason why we re-
jected theper se rule urged by Washington.5 7
The two district courts which examined the American Medicorp
tender offer both concluded that a bank may not rely on the tar-
get's confidential information when making the tender offer loan
evaluation, but neither decision gave an explanation of this
view.58
A fundamental problem impedes the use of all available infor-
mation in loan evaluations. Any information that a borrower
gives to a bank during the tentative stages of a lending relation-
ship serves to establish not only the feasibility of the loan, but also
the mutual expectations of the parties. Indeed, the quality and
quantity of this information limits the extent to which special or
fiduciary relations control the behavior of the parties59 and is con-
sequently an important element of their lending relationship.
An analogy can be drawn to the situation in which a prospec-
tive seller of a product approaches a prospective buyer and in the
process of negotiations discloses information about the manufac-
turing process. As applied in the context of this Note, a borrower
corporation is selling its ability to repay a loan to a prospective
lender, and nonpublic proprietary information provides the incen-
tive for the deal. Such a buyer-seller situation was addressed in
Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc. ,6 where the plaintiff desired to sell
the defendant a business that produced a nonpatented liquid
fingernail hardener. The plaintiff contended that in the ultimately
unsuccessful negotiating process certain trade secrets were dis-
closed to the prospective buyer. Five months after discussions ter-
minated, the defendant began marketing its own liquid hardener.
In examining the nature of the relationship between the parties
pertaining to the use of information that was disclosed during ne-
gotiations, the court held the circumstances and understandings of
the parties to be controlling:
57. 602 F.2d at 603.
58. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 475 F. Supp.
at 8; Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The issue of internal misuse of confiden-
tial information was not addressed by the Washington Steel district court opinion. 465 F.
Supp. 1100 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
59. See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
60. 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963).
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While there is no indication that plaintiff extracted from de-
fendants a promise of trust with respect to information dis-
closed during negotiations, an express agreement is not a
prerequisite to the establishment of a confidential relation-
ship. ... A relationship of trust and confidence may naturally
result from the circumstances surrounding the dealings between
the parties. . . . Where, as here, the parties are a seller and a
prospective purchaser, certain disclosures will usually be made
about the thing which is for sale so that the purchaser may ra-
tionally assess the merits of concluding the bargain. ... As
the prospective seller is given the information for the limited pur-
pose of aiding him in deciding whether to buy, he is bound to re-
ceive the information for use within the ambit of this limitation. 6 1
Thus, the understandings of the parties as to the basis on
which information is transmitted establishes the confidential na-
ture of that information for purposes of the particular relation-
ship. 2 If the recipient of information knows that the issuer
intends the contents to be confidential and accepts them as such,
then the understanding is binding regardless of whether the recipi-
ent could have gained the knowledge from another source. 3
Even if the information given to the bank by a prospective bor-
rower-specifically, projections on future earnings and intended
capital development plans64-- could be compiled from another
source, the manner in which they were received would preclude
the use of those particular materials outside the loan transactions
61. Id at 587 (emphasis added). This case was ultimately dismissed because no use of
the confidential information was found at the trial level. The appellate court held that this
finding was not clearly erroneous. Id at 590.
62. For a discussion of "qualifiedly confidential" information, see note 32 supra.
63. Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1963).
64. In Washington Steel the court noted the nature of the materials transmitted:
Chemical received certain information, some of which was non-public in nature.
This information included a May, 1973 Study produced by Washington, provid-
ing cash flow and earnings projections for Washington through 182. In addition,
Washington supplied Chemical with quarterly statements of its financial affairs as
well as a year-end statement dated December 28, 1978, for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1978.
602 F.2d at 596.
The American Medicorp case involved similar information, which, as noted by Judge
McMillen, is probably representative of the types of information present in most long-term
lending arrangements:
Such information includes many types of financial reports, including a five-year
projection, all of which were obtained by the defendant in order to evaluate mak-
ing a loan to plaintiff and entering into another banking relationship with it.
They are, we believe, the customary package of documents presented by a pro-
spective borrower to a financier, and we assume they werepresented with the under-
standing that they would be retained in a confidential posture within the bank, and
also not disclosed to outsiders.
475 F. Supp. at 8 (emphasis added).
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for which they were transmitted.65
Bank cases support the argument that a lender may not appro-
priate for its own use information confidentially supplied by a
prospective borrower. In Pigg v. Robertson66 the plaintiff ap-
proached the defendant, whom he believed to be an officer of the
bank, and disclosed his desire to obtain a loan for the purchase of
a farm.67 The defendant told the plaintiff that he could not make
the loan with the type of collateral offered.68 Subsequently, the
defendant entered a contract to purchase the farm that plaintiff
had intended to buy.69 The court held that a jury would have
been entitled to find that the plaintiffs disclosures were subject to
the obligations of a confidential relationship,7" and that the de-
fendant's actions constituted a breach of those obligations.
Similarly, in ML. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus7 the court ex-
amined the duties of a recipient of confidential information ob-
tained in the course of lending negotiations.72 The plaintiff
contended that it had approached the defendant bank officer for a
future loan and in the ensuing conversation disclosed information
concerning an impending purchase of property, thereby creating a
fiduciary relationship.73 The defendant allegedly breached a duty
to the plaintiff by acting as an agent for another party in the
purchase of the same property.
This case is significant for its treatment of the relationship be-
65. In Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241 (1949), the court noted the general
duty of nonappropriation which arises when an employee learns of confidential business
information: "[I1f an employee in the course of his employment acquires secret informa-
tion relating to his employer's business, he occupies a position of trust and confidence to-
ward it analogous in most respects to that of a fiduciary . I. " ld at 244. The fiduciary
duties of a recipient of confidential information stem from an appreciation of the import of
the information received and not necessarily the position of the individual receiving the
information. See note 67 infra.
66. 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
67. The defendant in this case was not an officer of the bank but an outside auditor
who had been using the bank president's office. He had answered questions for bank cus-
tomers when they were directed to him by bank employees. The court found that a jury
could, therefore, find that a bank customer approaching the defendant on the direction of a
bank employee would expect his confidences to be respected. It was noted that ajury could
find that the defendant "could reasonably be expected to know that such reliance was being
placed in him." Id at 601.
68. Id at 599.
69. Id
70. Id at 602.
71. 124 Misc. 86, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
72. The court ultimately found that no confidential information had been transmitted,
and that which was conveyed was inaccurate. Id at 94, 207 N.Y.S. at 693.
73. Id at 88, 207 N.Y.S. at 687-88.
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tween bank and borrower when nonpublic information has been
transmitted during their dealings.74 In reasoning that "not the
nominal, but the actual, relation of the parties must be examined
in order to determine whether there has been a breach of trust,"75
the court noted that "a trust or fiduciary relation in its strict sense
. . . is created only by mutual consent, express or implied."76 The
court, however, then noted that a bank encourages the submission
of information in a confidential posture:
Of course, no man can obtrude either his trust or his secrets
upon another, to the extent of imposing upon that other any
obligation in regard thereto, any more than he can render an-
other his bailee invitum. In that respect banks present a con-
stant invitation to intending borrowers, and thus subject
themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to be drawn
from that fact ...
Moreover, I assume that if a person applies for a loan, and
in connection with that application discloses his purpose to
avail of a bargain which he had not as yet closed by contract,
and of which the lender had not previously heard, the courts,
whether of law or equity, would afford some form of adequate
relief in case the applicant was forestalled in his project by the
lender."
This line of reasoning is clearly applicable to a bank's appropria-
tion of the confidential information supplied by one borrower in
connection with a loan to another borrower. In establishing its
lending relationship with the first borrower, the bank invites, in-
deed requires, the submission of proprietary information from
that borrower. Certainly, the use of that information outside of
that relationship is not an element of the parties' mutual consent.
Accordingly, use of that information for one party's institutional
benefit constitutes a breach of the resultant confidential relation-
ship.7
8
74. In light of the court's holding, its statements on this point, though significant, are
dicta. See note 72 sufpra.
75. 124 Misc. at 90, 207 N.Y.S. at 690.
76. Id at 89, 207 N.Y.S. at 689.
77. Id at 92-93, 207 N.Y.S. at 692.
78. In the recent case of Walton v. Morgan Stanley Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1980), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined the duties of an investment
banker regarding confidential information received from a target company in the context
of tender offer negotiations.
In Walton, Morgan Stanley solicited and received favorable confidential internal earn-
ings projections from Olincraft, Inc. for use in connection with a prospective bid for Olin-
craft by Kennecott Copper Corp. Olincraft supplied this information with the instruction
that it was to be used solely for the Kennecott bid and was to be returned if the bid did not
go through. Id. at 797. Kennecott did not bid, but after another company, Texas Eastern
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An action brought by a target corporation which is based on
the appropriation of its proprietary information would raise the
issue of whether damage to the target is a necessary element of the
claim. The issue has already been raised in defending a share-
holder's derivative action against a corporate officer or director
who traded in the securities of his or her company. In Diamond v.
Oreamuno79 the New York Court of Appeals determined that
under the common law of that state, damage to the corporation is
not a necessary element of a cause of action founded on a breach
of fiduciary duty. 0 Under this rule, damage computation will be
Corp., announced its intention to acquire Olincraft, Morgan Stanley purchased 149,200
shares of Olincraft for its own account. Id. at 797. After this purchase, Morgan Stanley
disclosed the confidential Olincraft information to Johns-Manville in an effort to induce a
higher bid from Johns-Manville. Id. Johns-Manville ultimately outbid Texas Eastern, and
a merger of Johns-Manville and Olincraft was arranged. Subsequently, a suit was filed by
former Olincraft shareholders, seeking an accounting of the profits received by Morgan
Stanley in its purchase and sale of Olincraft stock.
Judge Morris Lasker of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing because of their failure
to allege that injury to Olincraft resulted from Morgan Stanley's actions. Id. at 798. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on a new
ground: Morgan Stanley had dealt with Olincraft on an arm's length basis and owed no
fiduciary duty to Olincraft which would prevent its disclosing the Olincraft information to
Johns-Manville. Therefore, the plaintiff had failed to state a claim. Essentially, the court
held that mere receipt of confidential information, without a further fiduciary relationship,
does not support a duty to preserve the confidentiality of that information.
While the majority opinion found no duty to preserve the confidentiality of Olincraft's
information absent a more compelling fiduciary duty, Id. at 798-99, Judge Oakes' dissent
offered a position similar to that advocated in this Note. He found that although Morgan
Stanley was not an agent of Olincraft and, as it was hired by the prospective bidder Kenne-
cott, had no pre-existing duty to that company, a duty did exist to preserve the Olincraft
information.
[A]fter Olincraft began to cooperate in the deal by turning over the "Confidential
Inside Information" as to favorable earnings prospects, I think the acceptance of
such information by Morgan Stanley, on the confidential terms, along with its
understood role as an intermediary in a cooperative takeover, imposed a duty on
the investment banker under well-established common law principles not to use
that information for its own profit.
Id. at 801. Where the majority would require evidence of some extraordinary agreement in
order to sustain the plaintiffs case, Judge Oakes would infer such an agreement from ac-
ceptance of the information, along with knowledge of the terms of transmittal. Id. at 801
n.3.
Both investment bankers, as corporate marriage-brokers, and commercial banks, as
financiers of tender offers, are repositories of confidential information. Information which
is transmitted and received specifically within the confines of a particular transac-
tion-here, the Kennecott bid-is intrinsically an element of that transaction. Hence, the
disclosure or use of that information by either an investment bank or a commercial bank
for its own benefit is a violation of the duty to preserve that information.
79. 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969).
80. Id at 498. See also Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504, 508 (3d Cir.
1958) (the test of liability is unjust enrichment, not damage to the corporation, when a
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based solely upon the unjust enrichment of the party appropriat-
ing confidential information.
Other jurisdictions follow an opposing view and require that
injury to the corporation be shown in order to maintain a deriva-
tive action for damages. In Schein v. Chasen8t the Florida
Supreme Court expressly rejected both the Diamond rule and a
proposed extension of that rule which would have embraced a re-
cipient of confidential information who was not party to a fiduci-
ary relationship with the corporation. 82 Similarly, in Freeman v.
Decio83 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that Indiana law would follow the Florida approach, and it re-
quired proof of injury to a corporation whose information had
been utilized by a director for his own personal benefit.8 4
The two positions may be distinguished on the basis of the
characterization given to the appropriated corporate information.
The Diamond approach views nonpublid proprietary information
as an asset of the corporation to which corporate fiduciaries owe a
duty of loyalty.85 The alternate approach implies only a duty of
care, not a duty of loyalty, and therefore requires injury to the
corporation before a remedy is available.8 6
If the Diamond rule is followed, the use of confidential materi-
als by a fiduciary for its own benefit, without authorization by the
issuer of the information, gives rise to a cause of action, with a
remedy of the profits obtained.87 When a bank appropriates in-
formation supplied by a borrower for use in determining the de-
director utilizes the assets or business opportunities of the corporation for personal benefit);
Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 246 (1949) (public policy will not permit an
employee occupying a position of trust and confidence t6 benefit from that position regard-
less of whether loss to the corporation is found).
81. 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
82. Id at 746.
83. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
84. Id at 196. The court of appeals chose not to employ the Indiana certified question
statute, thereby declining to put the issue to the Indiana Supreme Court, because it found
that there was no basis for the claim that the corporation's stock was sold on the basis of
inside information. Id at 189 n.8.
85. The court in Freeman v. Decio analyzed the Diamond rule in such terms but held
that it might be better to determine whether loss to the corporation is present before deter-
mining whether there has been a breach of the duty of loyalty. The Freeman court's posi-
tion was likened to that of the corporate opportunity doctrine, which inquires whether loss
is present before deciding that an opportunity is present. 584 F.2d 186, 193 (7th Cir. 1978).
86. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 193-94 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.
2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975).
87. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498 (1969). The Diamond court relied
heavily on the opinion in Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241 (1949). See note 80
supra.
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sirability of making a loan to another client, its initial "profits"
take the form of a competitive advantage over other banks from
which the offeror could seek financing. Since the first borrower
corporation treats its proprietary information as confidential, this
knowledge will not be publicly available. If this nonpublic infor-
mation is relevant and material to the second borrower's ability to
repay the loan under consideration, the bank will have a more
accurate picture of the second borrower's financial condition and
will therefore be able to make a more informed decision.8" Ac-
cordingly, a bank which has special, nonpublic knowledge of this
variety may be willing to make a loan which another lending insti-
tution would regard as unjustifiably risky.89 The bank would thus
reduce the risk of its loan decision and thereby gain pecuniary
benefit.
The foregoing analysis presents a problem in determining
what relief the injured party may receive: the actual advantage to
the bank is difficult to quantify in monetary terms. It may also be
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what percentage of the
bank's return on the loan is attributable to the use of nonpublic
information. Of course, if it can be shown that, without the
knowledge appropriated from its other customer, the bank would
not have made the loan, then all of the profit received by the
lender would be traced to the appropriation. If, on the other
hand, by virtue of the nonpublic information and the favorable
picture it paints regarding the second borrower's credit risk, the
bank is simply willing to lend money at a lower rate than it would
have had not the confidential information been employed, it
would seem that none of the profit would result from the appro-
priation.9" Furthermore, due to the discretionary character of
lending, it may be very difficult for the injured borrower to prove
that the bank did not rely solely on the information supplied by
the second borrower. Thus, the party who has suffered the breach
may have a right without a remedy.
88. For a discussion of the circumstances in which information of the target-borrower
is particularly relevant to a second borrower's repayment ability in the context of a hostile
takeover, see notes 108-10 infra and accompanying text.
89. Of course, this would not be so if the target corporation had similar lending ar-
rangements with other major banks and these banks also chose to use information in a
similar manner. If the offeror-corporation sought financing from such a lending institution,
the same result would occur.
90. However, this analysis ignores the risk factor involved in tender offer loans. Bene-
fit to the bank in the form of reduced risk in deciding to lend on information not available
to other lenders would still be present.
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In the context of a hostile takeover in which the second bor-
rower intends to use the proceeds of the loan for the acquisition of
the first, the target corporation is not concerned primarily with
recovering the bank's profits; it is more interested in preventing
the bank from participating in its acquisition. It would seek to
enjoin the bank from lending to the offeror and thereby gain time
in which to develop a more complete anti-takeover strategy or
seek a more favorable offer.91 Moreover, considering that it is a
breach of a fiduciary relationship which has occurred, along with
the difficulty in quantifying both the amount of benefit received
by the breaching party and the damage to the target, an injunction
may be the most appropriate relief.92
If the rationale of Schein and Freeman is the theoretical basis
on which a target corporation must structure its action for injunc-
tive relief, a different problem is encountered: it would have to be
shown that irreparable harm will result to the target if the loan is
permitted to proceed and the tender offer to continue. 93
If the target's confidential information paints an unfavorable
financial picture and indicates that the acquisition of the target
will not significantly contribute to the offeror's total earnings, the
bank may establish a lower per share limit to which it will lend the
offeror. The shareholders of the target might then receive less
money per share than they would have had the bank not used the
confidential information in assessing the loan to the offeror-bor-
rower. Alternatively, if the target's nonpublic information reveals
a more favorable financial position than can be ascertained by
publicly available data, the bank may be willing to lend more to
the offeror. With a higher per share loan commitment, the offeror
may be willing to bid a higher price for the shares held by the
target's stockholders. In this scenario, the target company would
benefit from the bank's appropriation of the target's information
rather than suffer a loss.
It will, however, be difficult for a target corporation to show
the price differential which results from the bank's use of its infor-
91. See generally Steinbrink, supra note 1.
92. This was the remedy sought in both American Medicorp and Washington Steel.
Injunctive relief is also the means of preventing future harm arising from a continuing
scheme whereby the bank retains the benefit of its appropriation until the purchase has
been consummated and the loan repaid. See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 166
(1937).
93. The failure of American Medicorp, Inc. to show irreparable harm was one of the
factors on which the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the com-
pany's action for a preliminary injunction. 475 F. Supp. at 10.
1980]
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mation. Because of the discretionary nature of lending, no single
piece of information controls the amount to which an offeror will
be able to borrow. Therefore, in attempting to establish irrepara-
ble injury from internal use of its information, a target corpora-
tion may be required to identify some other element of loss.
A more subtle, though significant, injury to the target share-
holders occurs in the form of diminished bargaining capacity. In
the situation where, because of the bank's use of confidential in-
formation in setting a per share loan figure, the offeror has the
same information which is available to the target, an artificial ceil-
ing is placed on the negotiable offering price. 94 The result may be
a lower price offered to the shareholders. Of course, the share-
holder has the option of rejecting the offer and retaining his or her
holdings. Nevertheless, if the top price that the offeror is willing
to bid has been set by the bank's maximum per share figure and is
lower than the offeror's originally calculated maximum price, the
median negotiable price has been lowered by the bank and the
target shareholder has less leverage.
As a practical matter, a target corporation which suspects that
its lending bank has misused proprietary information faces a diffi-
cult burden of proof.95  Furthermore, once a cause of action is
made out, injunctive relief preventing the bank from further par-
ticipation in the financing of the tender offer may be the only ap-
propriate remedy. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances the
incentive for use of the information may be substantial,96 and
94. Ordinarily the shareholders of a corporation, through their management, have a
better estimation of the true worth of their company than any outside source. A corpora-
tion wishing to acquire the target will evaluate both its own financial condition and that of
the target from all available information and fix a break-even price at which it believes the
investment equals the price offered. The target company makes a similar evaluation of its
own worth, but because of superior information may set its figure higher or lower than that
of the offeror. In the bargaining process each party seeks to maximize its gain. The offeror
will bid a price which it believes to be lower than the true value of the target, yet attractive
enough to cause the target's shareholders to sell. The target shareholders will respond by
accepting the offer if they perceive this to be the best price they can obtain. If not, the offer
will be rejected and the offeror-corporation will respond with a second bid, higher than the
first but still less than the figure it has fixed as a break-even point. The negotiations will
continue in this manner until a price is reached at which each party believes it has achieved
the maximum gain possible.
95. This is particularly true when confidential information does not actually pass
hands between loan officers, but rather remains with the same personnel who have worked
on prior loans to the target and have had access to the confidential information in connec-
tion with those previous transactions, but who are also involved with the loan to the of-
feror.
96. See notes 108-10 infra and accompanying text.
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when this motive is coupled with a proof burden which may be
virtually impossible to sustain, an absolute prohibition on banks
entering into such tender offer financing may be the only feasible
way to regulate potential abuse.97
The ramifications of such a conclusion parallel those of an ab-
solute prohibition based on the duty not to act adversely to a bor-
rower's interests: a new defense strategy for potential targets will
be created.98 A more innovative and less commercially burden-
some approach would place a rebuttable presumption of misuse
on a bank which chooses to participate in financing the takeover
of its corporate borrower.99 Of course, "it seems highly desirable
that the potential for conflict should be avoided by the voluntary
behavior of the bank itself'' 1L--that is, by not participating in the
financing.
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that a target corpo-
ration may have a sound argument on which to establish a claim
for injunctive relief and thereby prevent a bank which has used
the target's nonpublic information from participating in the tar-
get's acquisition. As previously noted, the court in American
Medicorp agreed with this reasoning, but the Washington Steel
appellate decision took the opposite position.' 1 The policy con-
siderations on which the Washington Steel court grounded its be-
liefs-that banks will be forced to proceed blindly, without the use
of all available information, and that the free flow of bank financ-
ing will be restricted by excessive caution on the part of lenders to
corporations 1°---ignore the fact that information supplied to the
bank in a confidential lending relationship is an element of that
relationship. Consequently, its use is restricted by the parameters
of the expectations of the parties.
C. Indirect Disclosure to the Offeror of Confidential Information
Receivedfrom the Target
A second breach of fiduciary duty may contemporaneously oc-
97. See generally Mendez-Penate, The Bank "Chinese Wall" Resolving and Contend-
ing with Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING LJ. 674, 687-88 (1976) (noting that all lending
department activities of a bank may be tainted with the knowledge of confidential informa-
tion).
98. See text accompanying notes 24-31 supra.
99. See notes 185-91 infra and accompanying text.
100. Humana,,Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
101. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
102. 602 F.2d at 603.
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cur with the internal use of confidential information supplied by
one client in connection with a loan to a second borrower-a
breach which takes the form of an indirect or disguised disclosure
of that information. As previously noted, there is a general duty
not to disclose information which has been transmitted and re-
ceived in a confidential posture; 10 3 an aura of trust and confidence
encompasses the issuer and recipient of nonpublic materials. A
bank is not at liberty to disclose the details of a depositor's ac-
count, 10 4 nor may it directly disclose information which has been
transmitted to the bank by a customer in connection with a lend-
ing transaction. In short, courts will find that "a special relation-
ship which may be designated fiduciary or confidential does exist
between a prospective borrower and its bank which should pre-
clude the bank from disseminating or using the information for
improper purposes."' °5 As noted above, the understanding of the
parties regarding the confidential nature of the materials governs
how they are to be maintained. 10 6
In a proposed hostile takeover, if the offeror knows of the
bank's internal use of the target's confidential proprietary infor-
mation in assessing the loan to the offeror, a disguised revelation
of the information results. There is a statement on the desirability
of the acquisition implicit in the granting of the loan.'0 7 Con-
versely, a denial of the loan may carry an implicit negative state-
ment. A more significant revelation-and a more explicit
violation of a confidential relationship-occurs when the bank
grants a loan to an offeror-borrower expressly for use in making a
cash tender offer for the shares of the target-customer, but condi-
tions the loan upon a particular per share offering price, or range
of prices. If the bank agrees to extend the loan, but sets a maxi-
103. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
104. See, e.g., Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 36, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (1937);
Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So.2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1969).
105. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
106. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
107. This argument was raised and rejected in American Medicorp. See Note, supra
note 32, at 836. See also Letter from SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams to Senator Wil-
liam Proxmire and accompanying Exhibits (Feb. 15, 1980), reprinted in [Current] SEc.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) Special Supplement No. 542 at 9 [hereinafter Williams Letter],
noting that when a bidder learns of a bank's possession of material nonpublic information
concerning the target company, it may draw an inference regarding either the nature of the
information possessed or the desirability of the target as an acquisition. For reference to
indirect disclosure in connection with possible Rule lOb-5 implications, see Comment,
supra note 17, at 448.
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mum per share price limit, it participates in the decisionmaking of
the offeror's management.
A variation on this form of indirect transfer takes place when
the offeror approaches the bank for tender offer financing and in-
forms the bank of the range of possible bid prices it intends to use.
In using its confidential knowledge of the target to decide that it
will grant a loan sufficient to cover this range, the bank impliedly
states to the offeror that the acquisition would be a sound transac-
tion within the range of prices set forth. In this sense, the bank
provides an independent confirmation of the accuracy of the of-
feror's analysis. The superior information possessed by the bank
supplements management's information and assures that the of-
feror has selected a sound range of bid prices. The stronger the
inference of the desirability of the acquisition for the offeror, the
more valuable the disguised information is to the offeror, and the
more significant or direct the disclosure.
Two important reservations must be attached to this notion of
an indirect disclosure. First, the information on the target's
financial condition must be of substantial importance to the bank.
Although knowledge of the target's ability, once acquired, to con-
tribute to the offeror's total earnings is always of some value to the
bank, a bank will not ordinarily base its loan decision exclusively
on the target's financial health; there are too many contingencies
involved in a hostile takeover. 08 For example, in the loan to
Humana by Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Com-
pany, a "worst case analysis" approach was used in determining
whether the bank would finance Humana's intended takeover of
American Medicorp.109 By this method, an analysis was made of
the offeror's ability to repay the proposed loan in the event that it
was unable either to gain total control of the target or to divest its
partial holdings. The financial condition of the target was of rela-
tively minor importance. In such a situation, authorization of the
loan may convey little information by inference to the offeror. It
is important to note, however, that the greater the size of the target
in proportion to that of the offeror, the greater the target's ability
to enhance the offeror's ability to repay the loan after the acquisi-
108. Judge McMillen noted in American Medicorp that because of the peculiar context
of a hostile takeover, a lender would not be wise to make a loan on "the assumption that
the assets of the company to be acquired were required to repay the loan." American
Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 475 F. Supp. at 9.
109. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCII) 96,286 at 92,829 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tion. This is particularly true when the offeror is highly leveraged
and will rely heavily on the target's cash flow for repayment.°"0 .In
such circumstances the bank would put greater weight on a tar-
get's financial position in evaluating the offeror's total cash flow
following the acquisition.
The second qualification on an assertion of indirect disclosure
concerns the offeror's awareness of the lender's possession of the
target's confidential proprietary information. If the offeror does
not know that the bank possesses confidential information about
the target's financial condition, it can infer only that the bank
views the offeror's repayment ability favorably. It would reason-
ably assume that the bank based its decision on the offeror's pres-
ent assets, projected future earnings-both with and without the
addition of the target-and whatever publicly available informa-
tion exists about the target. If, however, the borrower knows of
the bank's possession and use of nonpublic information concern-
ing the target's finances, or can reasonably assume that the bank
has used such information because of the size and cash flow
problems addressed above, it may regard the loan as an endorse-
ment of the propitiousness of the takeover."'
The only case to address the concept of indirect disclosure,
American Medicorp, reflected strong reservations on the content of
the implied statement.
[I]t does not tell outsiders anything which they did not already
know or should be able to infer. They knew or could easily
have discovered that plaintiff [target] was a customer of the de-
fendant [bank] and had a substantial business banking relation-
ship with it, from which it would follow that [defendant bank]
had obtained considerable favorable information from the
plaintiff.' " 2
Thus, American Medicorp would imply that if a statement on
110. This point was noted by counsel for Washington Steel. Brief for Appellee at 38,
Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1979).
111. An established, notorious policy of nonuse or the presence of an information
transfer barrier between loan accounts would negate the reasonableness of the assumption.
See text accompanying notes 185-91 infra. If no such policy exists, and the offeror is
aware of sizable lending agreements between the bank and the target, the offeror could
reasonably assume that the target supplied the bank with the same types of information
that it was required to supply in connection with its tender offer loan negotiations. There-
fore, the offeror would have a good idea of the type of information about the target that
was possessed by the bank.
112. 475 F. Supp. at 9. This comment is essentially dicta. Judge McMillen disregarded
evidence that although Continental had informed Humana and other participating banks




the condition of the target is implicit in granting the loan to the
offeror, that statement embodies only publicly available informa-
tion and therefore is not an improper disclosure.
This line of reasoning, however, is subject to two criticisms.
First, the existence of an established lending relationship does not
by itself support an inference that the target is in sound financial
condition. Second, restrictions on the purchase price imposed by
the lending bank generate a more pointed inference as to the value
of the target than would an unconditional approval of the loan.
When the offeror is aware that the lender has analyzed the
financial condition of the target, any price limitation imposed by
the lender operates as the guidance of an independent analyst. 1 3
The result is that the offeror has acquired the benefit of an in-
formed second opinion.
Because of the possibility of indirect information transfer, an
offeror may derive a substantial competitive advantage over other
offerors through the choice of its lender. The target's bank, aware
of detailed proprietary information, may be willing to make the
loan to the offeror, while a bank without such information might
not. In addition, if the bank limits the per share price to be paid,
the offeror may develop a clearer analysis of the target's true
value. Benefit to the offeror may have adverse consequences for
the shareholders of the target, for indirect disclosure to the offeror
may reduce the bargaining leverage of the target's shareholders.' "4
For example, if the lender imposes a low per share price ceiling,
the acquisition may be carried out at a price lower than that which
may have been obtainable without the direct or indirect convey-
ance of proprietary data to the offeror.
The bank also derives benefit from its use of the confidential
information and indirect transfer to the offeror.1 15 If, because of
its special knowledge of the target's condition, the bank is willing
to finance the tender offer where another institution would not, or
if it is willing to lend to a higher per share amount than it would
have had not the confidential information been employed, then all
or a substantial increment of return on the loan is attributable to
the use of the information.
In seeking a remedy for the breach of a fiduciary relationship
113. For a discussion of the types of information on which the offeror could assume the
bank had based its decision, see note 101 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
115. This benefit is similar to that derived from appropriation. See text accompanying
notes 85-89 supra.
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based on an indirect disclosure of confidential information, the
target will encounter the same difficulties inherent in a breach by
misuse: damage to the shareholders in the form of a lower price
per share offer will be very difficult to show and benefit to the
bank virtually impossible to ascertain. 1 6 Because of these diffi-
culties in determining a monetary remedy, injunctive relief would
again seem the most appropriate course to pursue, particularly be-
cause the target's goal is to prevent the transaction before a public
bid is offered. The model presented in this Note contemplates the
target's discovery or suspicion of the use of its information before
any actual sale of stock has occurred. At that point in the se-
quence of events, the bank has received no measurable benefit
from including its knowledge of the target's financial conditions in
its loan decision. The offeror, however, has received the informa-
tion through the implied disclosure. Injunctive relief would pre-
vent the bank from receiving the fruits of its transgression and
would limit the additional harm to the target which would flow
from culmination of the tender offer.
An action against the offeror presents a different problem. It is
the act of disclosure which constitutes the breach, not receipt of
the information. The recipient who has done nothing to en-
courage or assist in the breach is, in a sense, a bystander. Also,
like the benefits received by the bank and the damage to the tar-
get, any advantage gained by an offeror through this form of dis-
guised disclosure is difficult to quantify. Yet, as a practical matter,
an injunction which prevents the bank from continued participa-
tion in the tender offer also operates against the offeror. An in-
junction will give the target the benefit of delay and force the
offeror to seek other financing.
More importantly, an injunction prohibiting the offeror from
making a public bid for the shares of the target is the only method
of preventing a second disclosure and denying the offeror the ben-
efits of the bank's wrong. This is so because, as the offeror appre-
ciates the nonpublic nature of the information it receives, it
becomes a holder of that confidential information; an uninten-
tional confidential relationship between the target and the offeror
is created and the offeror should be bound by an obligation of
nondisclosure." 7 Yet, the public bid for the shares of the target
116. See text accompanying notes 89-95 supra.
117. In Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739, 743-46 (Fla. 1975), the Florida Supreme
Court expressly rejected the theory that a confidential or fiduciary relationship is created
between a corporation and a party who receives confidential information through an inter-
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may result in a second indirect disclosure because it may change
the perceptions of the target's value held by the target's creditors
and other potential offerors. By making the same reasonable as-
sumptions that the offeror makes about the bank's incentive for
using nonpublic material, these other parties may know or have
reason to know of the bank's possession and use of the target's
information in making the loan to the offeror. The price which is
bid for the shares may then be perceived by these outside parties
as reflecting a more accurate analysis of the value of the target
than the present market price reflects, thereby altering the public
perception of the target, and resulting in a second breach by infer-
ential disclosure.
Notwithstanding the many opportunities for indirect disclo-
sure of confidential information, a target corporation bears a
heavy burden of proof. Not only must internal misuse be demon-
strated, but the knowledge of such by the recipient and the rele-
vance of the target's information to the offeror's financing must be
proven as well. Because the bank has the same incentive for use
in this context as in appropriation without disclosure, an equal or
stronger argument can be made for the absolute prohibition of
such behavior as the only feasible means of preventing potential
abuse." 8
With the exception of the cursory treatment given by Judge
McMillen inAmerican Medicorp, 119 the issue of indirect disclosure
has not been considered by the courts. In part, this may be due to
the limited circumstances in which a bank would use information
regarding one client in connection with a loan to another. Never-
theless, in the situation where a bank has sufficient incentive for
such use, and the second client knows of both the bank's posses-
mediary, and it adopted the position of the dissenting opinion from the federal appellate
decision on that case. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), remanded and eertfed to
the Florida Supreme Court, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
The reasoning of the Florida court would also seem to be the logical progression of the
Second Circuit's analysis in Walton v. Morgan Stanley Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir.
1980), discussed at note 78 supra. In that case the court held that the direct recipient of
information from a subject company owes no duty to that company and may both disclose
the information and use it for profit as long as there is no special relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties. It would follow that an individual who received confiden-
tial information of the subject company indirectly through a financial intermediary and
who had no pre-existing relationship with the subject company would have no duty to
refrain from using the information for its own benefit.
118. See note 117 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
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sion of confidential information and the probability that it will be
incorporated as a primary element of the lending decision, an ar-
gument for a breach of fiduciary duty by disclosure of confidential
information is compelling. 2 °
II. VIOLATION OF RULE lOb-5
The same set of facts which may give rise to a breach of a
fiduciary obligation by indirect disclosure of confidential informa-
tion may also provide the basis for a private cause of action for
"tipping" under section 10(b), t2 ' the general antifraud provision
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's Rule l0b-5. 2 2 These provisions are di-
rected at both "the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only
for a corporate purpose" 2 3 and the unfairness which results when
a party uses such nonpublic information for its own benefit in
dealing with those who do not have such information. 2 4
The possibility of applying these antifraud provisions to the
factual setting presented in this Note has not been addressed by
any court. It is clear, however, that acceptance of this theory
would turn on the recognition that some form of information
transfer has occurred between a bank and an offeror when the
bank grants a tender offer loan based on an analysis which in-
cludes nonpublic information about the target. The applicability
of Rule lOb-5 to such a scenario will depend upon the characteri-
zation of the information transfer as selective disclosure or tip-
ping. In general, persons whose special relationship to a publicly
traded corporation gives them access to material nonpublic infor-
mation are not permitted either to disclose or trade selectively
upon that information, or to recommend that others do so, unless
the nonpublic information is disclosed to the general investing
120. The validity of this argument would be diminished by the presence of some form
of internal mechanism at the bank which prevents information transfer between loan ac-
counts. See text accompanying notes 185-91 infra.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). "Tipping" is the act of giving inside information to
outsiders in a breach of trust. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). A private cause of action under these provisions is
a judicial creation. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Judge Gibbons noted
in Washington Steel that a violation of the antifraud provisions could have resulted from a
direct disclosure of information from the bank to the offeror. 602 F.2d at 604.
123. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
124. Id See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 77,629 (1968).
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community.125 The selective disclosure or deceptive device which
constitutes a violation is not limited to a single form. "These anti-
fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of particular
acts or practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to
encompass the infinite variety of devices by which undue advan-
tage may be taken of investors and others."' 26
Three transgressions of the antifraud provisions may arise
from an indirect disclosure of nonpublic information regarding a
target firm. First, if a statement on the desirability of the acquisi-
tion is implicit in granting a loan to the offeror-borrower, a recom-
mendation to purchase the shares of a corporation may be made
on the basis of nonpublic information. Second, if setting a per
share amount which it will lend the offeror-borrower constitutes
assistance in the offeror's determination that the value at which
the price it pays equals the worth of the investment, the bank may
have indirectly disclosed the information on which it has based its
computation. Third, if the offeror-borrower reasonably perceives
the loan as a recommendation to buy or the per share lending
limitation as a statement of the value of the target, while knowing
the types of nonpublic information used in the bank's decision,
subsequent purchase of the stock may constitute trading on non-
public information." 7
125. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
236 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC
v. Lum's Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). "Nonpublic information" under
federal securities law differs from the concept under common law principles, where fiduci-
ary obligations pertaining to the information arise from the understandings and expecta-
tions of the parties. The concept of material inside information under Rule lOb-5 is "based
in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market place that all investors trad-
ing on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information ....
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
Information is material, in this application, where there is a "substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1975). Although the Court in TSC was address-
ing the concept of materiality in the context of a violation of Rule 14a-9, this definition has
been applied to violations of Rule lOb-5 by the courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977).
An agreement between the bank and the borrower on the confidentiality of the materi-
als can be waived or altered, but the obligations arising under the antifraud provisions
cannot be modified by the parties. Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note I, at 676-77 n.l.
126. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961).
127. Generally, a person who purchases stock on the basis of material inside informa-
tion without disclosing that information does not engage in a fraud within the meaning of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 unless there is a duty to disclose the information. Such a duty does
not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. In the recent case of
Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court affrmed this principle and held
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An initial consideration in determining whether a tip has oc-
curred through the tender offer financing described in this Note is
the materiality 2 ' of the information which has been disclosed, or
upon which a recommendation is based. The nonpublic informa-
tion in this instance involves primarily projections of future sales
and earnings of the target corporation, 29 and it is clear that this
type of information is the most material knowledge a prospective
trader can obtain. 3 ° Earnings projections play a crucial part in
computing the present value of a corporation and thus would be
considered significant by a reasonable investor. Therefore, the di-
rect revelation of this information would certainly meet the test of
materiality. However, because of the indirect, inferential manner
of transmittal involved in granting the tender offer loan, a more
thorough analysis is required.
Few tender offer acquisitions of any consequence can be car-
ried out without a financing loan. The material information on
which the bank bases its loan determination is embodied in the
analysis transmitted to the offeror, and it serves as a positive state-
ment of the desirability of the acquisition. Similarly, when used
to compute a per share limit on bank financing, the material infor-
mation contributes to a more specific determination on what will
be the highest bid offered for a share of the target's stock. As pre-
viously noted, the decision of the bank consequently assists the
offeror's management in its decision regarding the value of the
investment and the calculation of the range of the price to be
bid. " ' Thus, the fact that the confidential information was used
by the bank in calculating a bid price is evidence of the informa-
tion's materiality. Given the inherent materiality of earnings pro-
that liability under these antifraud provisions "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id at 230.
However,
"Tippees" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know is
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider, Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (CA 2 1974).
The tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as a participant
after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty.
Id at 230 n.12.
128. See note 125 supra. See also Comment, supra note 17 (questioning the materiality
of information conveyed in this manner).
129. For a discussion of the types of materials involved in American Medicorp and
Washington Steel, see note 64 supra.
130. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1126, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aj'd 565
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
131. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
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jections, it follows that the disclosure of the information, a
recommendation to buy within the established price range, and
evidence of its materiality in the offeror's decision are all estab-
lished simultaneously.
In the prototypical case of a Rule 10b-5 violation by selective
disclosure, the materiality of the disclosed information is an ele-
ment separate and distinct from the use of the information by the
tippee in its decision to buy or sell securities. 132 Although in all
cases there must be some relation between the disclosure of the
information and market activity, 33 in limited circumstances the
two concepts will be so intertwined that they may function as one.
The implied disclosure and recommendation contained in the
grant of a tender offer loan, under the circumstances assumed by
this Note, presents a particularly cogent example of this intercon-
nection.
S.E. C v. Lum's, Inc. 134 involved such a disguised recommen-
dation to trade securities. In that case, the court addresssed a situ-
ation in which an institutional salesman for Lehman Brothers
received confidential information from a corporation which indi-
cated an unexpected, undisclosed downturn in earnings. The in-
formation was transmitted in confidence through a special
relationship established between the corporation and that particu-
lar salesman.' 35 The salesman had subsequent conversations with
an institutional dealer during which he implied that the corpora-
tion would experience an unexpected drop in earnings.' 36 In de-
termining whether the disclosure was "in connection with the
purchase or sale" by the institutional dealer, the court noted the
132. SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). As stated by a differ-
ent court,
[I]t seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in the Act, and
the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the phrase "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security" intended only that the de-
vice employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause reasonable
investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to
purchase or sell a corporation's securities.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968).
133. See SEC v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
134. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
135. Id at 1052-54.
136. As the opinion reported:
Jundt [agent for institutional dealer] testified that he remarked to Simon [sales-
man] that something must be wrong at Caesar's Palace [subsidiary of Lum's, Inc.],
and that the latter responded, "I have a gut feeling you're right". Sit [agent for
institutional dealer] recalled that Simon "did not quarrel" with their decision to
sell.
Id at 1059.
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link with materiality under these circumstances: "Although the
'in connection with' and 'materiality of the information' require-
ments are generally treated as separate elements of liability in a
lOb-5 action,. . . the two would seem to come together when a
discreet bit of inside information is conveyed and allegedly trig-
gers a discreet sale of a security."' 137 The existence of a unique
relationship between the salesman and the corporation was cited
as supporting the notion that in special circumstances inference
alone may constitute a material disclosure:
More significantly, Sit [an agent of the institutional dealer]...
reported that Simon [salesman] had ventured as a personal con-
clusion that [the corporation] would have higher expenses and
lower earnings. This evidence alone might be dispositive, given
Simon's unique relationship to Lum's and his prior recommen-
dation to [the dealer] to buy Lum's stock. In Texas GuW all that
defendant Darke had apparently said to one of his alleged tip-
pees was that the company "was a good buy." And it should be
remembered that the prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 extend to "re-
commending" the stock affected while in receipt of any mate-
rial inside information. 138
The relationships outlined in Lum's are analogous to those
present in a takeover loan decision. The offeror's knowledge of
both the bank's special relationship with the target and the bank's
use of confidential information in the loan determination
strengthens the statement implied by the granting of the loan.
139
As in Lum's, the materiality of the information on which the in-
ference is based is contained in the implied statement. 40 This im-
plied statement is both a recommendation and a disclosure.
Because the information transfer from the bank to the offeror is
inferential, it may be easier to demonstrate a recommendation to
an offeror who knows of the bank's use of material information
137. Id
138. Id
139. In his response to an inquiry by U.S. Senators William Proxmire, Paul S.
Sarbanes, and Harrison A. Williams, Jr., concerning the applicability of the federal securi-
ties laws to tender offer financing, Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, noted that a bank's effective disclosure of material, nonpublic in-
formation regarding the target to an offeror may result in the bank's liability as a tipper.
However, Chairman Williams expressed the view that if the bank does not directly disclose
the information, but merely uses it in making its loan determination, the "in connection
with" requirement of a lOb-5 action may be lacking. Williams Letter, supra note 107. It
would seem, however, that the implied statement and inferential disclosure envisioned by
Lum's would supply this missing element and complete the cause of action.
140. Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove that a recipient gave greater weight
to a statement than its intrinsic materiality would justify. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1976).
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than to specify precisely what information has been passed.
Under the peculiar circumstances of a tender offer loan arrange-
ment, a recommendation to purchase the shares of the target at an
agreed upon price range is also a form of disclosure.
Courts are not ordinarily confronted with assertions of "tip-
ping" arising from tender offer financing. Consequently, deriva-
tion of an appropriate remedy is also a rare occurrence. In the
case of an indirect transfer of information, the standard method of
correcting a selective disclosure before trading is a dissemination
of the information to the general investing public.14 ' However,
because of the inferential manner in which the offeror has re-
ceived the information, it may be difficult to release publicly that
which has been obtained. A disclosure of the fact that a loan has
been secured from a bank, or even the fact that a loan has been
obtained for an offer to be made at a particular price range, may
not reveal to the public what it reveals to that particular offeror.
This is so because the range of bid price established by the
concerted actions of the bank and the offeror is made on an evalu-
ation of the worth of the target to that particular offeror, and in-
cludes information about the offeror's finances as well as
information about-the target. Thus, the amount which the offeror
is willing to pay, and commensurately the amount which the bank
is willing to lend, will be unique to that offeror. Accordingly, un-
less the bank is willing to disclose publicly the information on
which it based its calculations, the material nonpublic information
which is contained in the range of price that can be bid will re-
main undisclosed. Yet, since such a disclosure of the target's pro-
prietary information would subject the bank to liability under
common law fiduciary principles,' 42 it will be hesitant to take such
action and, in fact, might be enjoined from doing so. Thus, since
neither the offeror nor the bank can adequately disclose the confi-
dential information at issue, the only effective remedy to prevent
trading on that information is to enjoin the offeror from bidding
for the target.
Such an injunction must necessarily be permanent, for once
the offeror has received the confidential information through its
loan negotiations with the bank, it cannot give up that knowledge.
141. See generally Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 235-38 (2d Cir. 1974) (the duty to "abstain or disclose" is imposed on both the tippee
and the nontrading tipper); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968).
142. See note 28 supra.
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Unless some future event destroys the relevance of the confiden-
tial information, 4 3 any future attempt by the offeror to acquire
the target will be based in part on the information. In other
words, the manipulative scheme whereby the offeror has gained
superior nonpublic knowledge continues so long as the knowledge
is material. Of course, the same reasoning should prevent the
bank from participating in any subsequent acquisition attempts
involving the same parties. 1" Additionally, the bank should be
enjoned from any future use of the confidential information of the
target corporation; there is a reasonable probability that similar
indirect disclosures would result from such transactions. 145
A private damage action under Rule lOb-5 will be difficult to
sustain on the theory that the target's shareholders have suffered a
loss. As noted above, 46 the loss of bargaining advantage is diffi-
cult to quantify. Also, the actual pecuniary loss-based on the
difference between what was actually offered for the stock and
what would have been offered had not the confidential informa-
tion been selectively disclosed-will also be difficult to calculate.
Moreover, neither of these claims could be asserted until a
purchase had actually been made. 4 7 Finally, the claims present
an evidentiary as well as a computational problem; it may be im-
possible to show that the bid price would have been different with-
out indirect access to the target's confidential information. 48
Permanent injunctive relief is also the most appropriate rem-
edy for a claim brought on the theory that disclosure has occurred
through an implied recommendation to acquire the target. An im-
plied recommendation arises from precisely the same actions as
the indirect disclosure and results in the offeror possessing pre-
cisely the same knowledge-the range of price to be offered which
will constitute a wise investment for the offeror. Likewise, the
bank will not want to disclose the information on which it based
143. For example, if the nonpublic informaton were a ten-year projection, the expira-
tion of the relevant period would negate the materiality of the information.
144. Liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 extends to nontrading tippers as well as
trading tippees. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237-38 (2d Cir. 1974).
145. This appears to be one of the purposes of an SEC enforcement action. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 42 F. Supp.
1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
146. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the purchaser-seller requirement in private damage actions, see
text accompanying notes 163-68 infra.
148. For a discussion of showing benefit to a bank from the use of nonpublic informa-
tion, see text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
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its recommendation. 149 The scheme will continue unless a suit en-
joins the disclosure of the target's proprietary information, arrests
the wrong, and furthers the objective of preventing injury to the
shareholders.150
As under a selective disclosure theory, the effect of the recom-
mendation to purchase the shares of the target at the specified
price range remains with the offeror; the knowledge that the ac-
quisition is a sound transaction for the offeror cannot be relin-
quished. Unless the bank discloses the information on which it
based its recommendation, or the target itself releases the same
materials to the general public, a permanent injunction is the only
way in which the recommendation would not be unfairly utilized
by the offeror in a future bid for that target.
A claim for injunctive relief, brought under either a theory of
disclosure of material inside information, or of recommendation
to deal in securities based on such information, addresses the un-
fairness which results when one party to a transaction has access
to informaton which is unavailable to the other.'5 ' It must be
noted that a violation of Rule lOb-5 is not limited to actual trad-
ing on confidential information; the antecedent tip has also been
held to violate the antifraud provisions.'52 Under this theory, the
act of tipping itself is the wrong which is being redressed.1 53 In
the tender offer situation, the interaction of the bank and offeror
in setting the price which will be bid constitutes the tip and, conse-
quently, the wrong. The act of making this price public then
causes harm to the shareholders, not because they deal with a
party who has access to superior information, but because they
lose bargaining capacity by virtue of the confidential information
incorporated into the bid.'54
Under this notion of violation, disclosure of the information to
the general investing public could compound the injury to the tar-
get shareholders by diminishing their bargaining capacity in deal-
149. See notes 142-44 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir. 1970) (it is not necessary to
establish all the elements of a suit for monetary damages in a claim for equitable relief; the
absence of a purchase or sale of securities is not fatal in an action which seeks to enjoin
deceptive practices which if continued would lead to completed purchases or sales giving
rise to a lOb-5 action).
151. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
152. See, ag., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974).
153. Id
154. See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
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ing with potential purchasers other than the original offeror.
Since the bid incorporates the content of the information trans-
ferred through the interaction of the bank and the offeror, when
the bid is publicly offered, the target shareholders lose the bar-
gaining advantage which they hold by virtue of the target man-
agement's superior knowledge of the value of their company. 55 If
the general investing public suspects that the bid price reflects a
more accurate valuation of the target's shares because of the of-
feror's access to the nonpublic information, other potential offer-
ors may alter their estimates accordingly, and thereby reduce the
potential leverage that the target shareholders have in the general
marketplace.' 56 If the confidential information used to compute
155. In the recent case of Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the dissenting opinions
of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun indicate a willingness to expand the tradi-
tional notions of fraud under § 10(b). Chief Justice Burger argued that the antifraud provi-
sions should be read to include within their reach any person engaged in any fraudulent
scheme; they should not be limited only to corporate insiders or deceptive practices related
to corporate information, but extended to any scheme whereby an investor is able to exert
undue trading advantage. Id at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As Chiarella dealt with an
employee of a printer of corporate documents who was able to decode classified informa-
tion concerning a pending tender offer, and subsequently trade in the securities involved,
the Chief Justice concentrated on the deceptive or fraudulent act of misappropriating confi-
dential information. He noted that it was through this fraud that the defendant was able to
exert undue trading advantage. Id at 241. In the context of the hostile tender offer dis-
cussed in this Note, the offeror obtains nonpublic information about the target through the
bank. By virtue of this information the offeror is able to reduce the target shareholders'
ability to bargain for the sale of their shares. In other words, because of the fraudulently
obtained information, the offeror is able to exert a trading advantage that it would not
otherwise have possessed.
Similarly, Justice Blackmun argued for a flexible application of the concept of fraud
under the securities laws. In his opinion he contended that even the concept of misappro-
priation addressed by the Chief Justice should be unnecessary to show a violation of
§ 10(b).
I would hold that persons having access to confidential material information that
is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by Rule lOb-5 from
engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage through
trading in affected securities. To hold otherwise, it seems to me, is to tolerate a
wide range of manipulative and deceitful behavior.
Id at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even more than the Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun
appears to favor a broad reading of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and therefore would appar-
ently sanction an interpretation of these provisions which would include the offeror's exer-
cise of the "structural informational advantage" gained by virtue of its choice of lending
institution.
156. To assume that the offer, when made public, constitutes a disclosure of the infor-
mation selectively received is to assume that the investing public perceives the offer in this
manner. If the bid is significantly different from that which any other potential offeror
would be willing to make, then the public could draw a reasonable conclusion that either
the bidder has access to information which is not generally available, or that the offeror has
somehow drastically miscalculated. Since the latter conclusion is unlikely, the former is a
more reasonable assumption. Still, unless there is some significant disparity between what
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the bid price is unfavorable, the offering price-and the altered
estimates of other potential buyers-will be lower than that which
would have been offered without the use of the information.
Thus, the shareholders will lose an amount equal to the difference
between the price offered and the price that would have been bid.
Hence, tender of the stock would result in a monetary loss directly
traceable to the offeror's receipt of nonpublic information. In this
scheme, the bid serves as both a disclosure of the material infor-
mation selectively received and an injury to the shareholder.
As it is a disclosure of the confidential information-by way of
the bid-which results in the harm rather than the nondisclosure
of selectively received information, an injunction which prevents
the public dissemination of the information is the appropriate
remedy. The offeror should be enjoined from making public the
bid which incorporates the target's confidential information. Even
if the bid would not be perceived by the public as a more accurate
valuation of the target company, the offeror should nevertheless
be enjoined from bidding for the target and thereby benefiting
from the target shareholder's diminished bargaining capacity.
In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. I" the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit grounded injunctive relief in a private
action upon justifications similar to those presented above. The
case addressed a continuing scheme to manipulate the price of
stock in order to acquire the interests of minority shareholders. In
endorsing the right of stockholders to enforce a private remedy
directed at halting the scheme, the court noted that the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws are not limited to legal remedies
and should be employed in a broad remedial manner to effectuate
their purpose.15 Such an expansive view was found to be particu-
larly appropriate where unusual burden of proof problems were
encountered in a damage action.
Moreover, as already indicated, the claim for damages on this
theory [manipulation of market price] founders both on proof
of loss and the causal connection with the alleged violation of
the Rule; on the other hand, the claim for injunctive relief
largely avoids these issues, may cure harm suffered by continu-
ing shareholders, and would afford complete relief against the
is bid by the offeror and what would be bid by any other entity, there may be nothing to
trigger suspicion that anyone possesses more information about the target than anyone else.
Thus, even though the bid comprises confidential information, if the investing public does
not suspect a disclosure, no disclosure is made.
157. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
158. Id at 547.
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Rule lOb-5 violation for the future. "It is not necessary in a
suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the ele-
ments required in a suit for monetary damages."' 59
Since injunctive relief is predicated here upon the need to
freeze a continuing deceptive scheme before actual monetary
damage results to the defrauded party, it would be reasonable to
relax traditional rules of standing to allow an injunction to be
sought by any party who might be injured by the fraud, and not
just a purchaser or a seller of securities. In Blue Chio Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores6 ' the Supreme Court enunciated the rule
that only parties who actually bought or sold securities involving
some form of fraudulent dealing had standing to bring a private
action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.' 6' Since
the model presented in this Note envisions an action brought
before any purchase of the target's stock has been made, a suit for
injunctive relief would be the only remedy available for a continu-
ing deceptive scheme.'62
Courts have acknowledged that a target's ability to assert
standing to sue for injunctive relief is necessary for an effective
remedy under Rule lOb-5.'63 It is not surprising, therefore, that
cases both before"6 and after 6 ' Blue Chip Stamps have recog-
nized the right of a party who is not a purchaser or a seller to
bring such an action. The rationale for these decisions fully com-
ports with the notion of preventing both the offeror, who has re-
ceived confidential information about a target, and the bank,
which disclosed that information, from completing the transaction
and thereby profiting from their acts. The Second Circuit's rea-
soning in Mutual Shares Corp v. Genesco, Inc. 166 is representative:
159. Id (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963)).
160. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
161. Id at 755.
162. If the fraudulent scheme has terminated, the exception to the purchaser-seller rule
may not be available for private injunctive actions. See, e.g., Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F.
Supp. 958, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
163. A target corporation was deemed to have standing for a tender offer injunction in
Moore v. Greatamerica Co., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967). This was an analogous
situation, where the target sought to prevent the making of misrepresentations to its share-
holders.
164. Landy v. F.D.I.C., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973); Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161
(3d Cir. 1970); Mutual Shares v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
165. Bertozzi v. King Louie Int., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,840 (R.I. 1976) (equitable relief other than an injunction would be impermissi-
ble in view of the purchaser-seller requirement).
166. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their
stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The com-
plaint alleges a manipulative scheme which is still continuing.
While doubtless the Commission could seek to halt such prac-
tices, present stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play "an
important role in enforcement" of the Act in this way ...
Deceitful manipulation of the market price of publicly-owned
stock is precisely one of the types of injury to investors that the
Act and the Rule were aimed. Since private parties have the
right to sue for violation of the Rule, the broad remedial pur-
poses of the Act suggest that the judicial relief available should
not be limited to a particular type of remedy.167
Thus, the courts recognize that an injunctive suit, as contrasted
with a damage action, is a prophylactic measure intended to pre-
vent the damage from occurring.' 6  Furthermore, it may be the
only effective means, other than an SEC enforcement proceeding,
of preventing irreparable injury.
One of the most difficult aspects of a target's action for injunc-
tive relief will be the issue of scienter. The Supreme Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 69 held that a private action for dam-
ages under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 requires proof of this
element-the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. The hos-
tile takeover model presented by this Note does not constitute a
clear case of scienter in the offeror, but merely a discovery or sus-
picion of the bank's use of the target's confidential information in
making the tender offer loan. These circumstances raise the issue
of the degree of scienter required to sustain a private injunctive
action.
At present, it is unclear precisely what degree of intent is nec-
essary to maintain such an action. The Court in Hochfelder spe-
cifically declined to consider whether scienter is a necessary
element for injunctive relief under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb--5.' 7 0 Lower courts focused on what constitutes the appropri-
ate standard for an injunctive action brought by the SEC, rather
than the standard of intent required in a private action for injunc-
tive relief. 7 ' The former question was recently resolved by the
167. Id at 546-47. In its proposed Federal Securities Code the American Law Institute
recognizes the force of this rationale in commenting: "[Niothing in the Code is inconsistent
with the holding in Mutual Shares Corp... . that the plaintiff need not be a buyer or seller
in order to obtain injunctive relief. ALI FED. SEC. CODE, Comment to § 1603 at
(3)(a)(iv) (March 1978 Draft).
168. See Landy v. F.D.I.C., 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973).
169. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
170. Id at 194 n.12.
171. Compare SEC v. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. 682, 710 (1978); SEC
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Supreme Court inAaron v. SEC, 72 where it was held that scienter
is a necessary element in an SEC injuncitve action under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Although the Court did not address the
issue of scienter in a private suit for injunctive relief, the language
of Justice Stewart's majority opinion implies that if the question
were presented, the Court would find that scienter is also an ele-
ment in a private action: "In our view the rationale of Hochfelder
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of
the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought." '173 Therefore, for
purposes of examining the conduct presented by the model under
consideration, it will be assumed that the standard of scienter re-
quired for an SEC enforcement action is also required for a pri-
vate injunctive action.
In considering the intent which accompanies the disguised dis-
closure or recommendation contained in granting a tender offer
loan, it is clear that the potential plaintiff will be confronting a
difficult burden of proof. Because of the implied or disguised na-
ture of the tip effectuated by the granting of the loan, it may be
difficult to show Hochfelder-type intent to deceive or defraud.
However, courts have mitigated this difficulty by permitting a
demonstration of recklessness to satisfy the intent requirement es-
tablished by Hochfelder.74 The form of reckless behavior ac-
cepted by the courts as adequate to maintain a lOb-5 private
action is the functional equivalent of intent.'75 In addressing this
concept in the context of an actionable omission under Rule
v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820, 825 (W.D. La. 1977); SEC v. American
Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977); and SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aed on other grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1977) (requiring scienter in an SEC enforcement proceeding) with SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (1st Cir. 1976) (scienter is not required).
172. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
173. Id. at 691.
174. The Supreme Court indicated the possibiliy of a recklessness standard in
Hochfelder, but it did not rule on the issue. 425 U.S. 194 n.12 (1976). For application of
the concept of recklessness as sufficient scienter by the lower courts, see Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977); Baily v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th
Cir. 1976).
175. In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court
reviewed the Second Circuit opinions on this issue. "Their language [Second Circuit opin-
ions], coupled with the Supreme Court's emphasis that scienter means intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud leads to a conclusion that only what Judge Friendly has character-
ized as the kind of recklessness that is equivalent to fraud will serve as a basis for liability."
Id at 1243 n.4 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968)). See
also SEC v. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. 682, 711 (1978).
[Vol. 31:132
FINANCING HOSTILE ACQUISITIONS
lOb-5, one court noted that by defining recklessness in this man-
ner, it may be said that the reckless person has actually used or
employed a deceptive device within the definition of section 10(b):
Under this definition, the danger of misleading buyers must be
actually known or so obvious that any reasonable man would
legally be bound as knowing, and the omission must derive
from something more egregious than even "white heart/empty
head" good faith. While this definition might not be the con-
ceptual equivalent of intent as a matter of general philosophy,
it does serve as a proper legally functional equivalent for intent,
because it measures conduct against an external standard
which, under the circumstances of a given case, results in the
conclusion that the reckless man should bear the risk of his
omission.176
In applying this concept to the bank's disguised release of con-
fidential information, it must be shown that the bank, as a matter
of law, should have understood that the granting of the loan con-
veyed a substantial amount of material nonpublic information to
the offeror. In other words, the implied conveyance of informa-
tion, or recommendation to trade in securities, must be so clear
that any reasonable person could justly be held, as a matter of
law, to have knowledge of the information transfer.
A particularly appropriate case for the application of reckless-
ness arose in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. 177 where it
was held that a party aiding in the fraud owed a fiduciary duty to
the defrauded party. The court examined the liability under Rule
lOb-5 of a broker who stood in a fiduciary capacity to a client and
had supervisory authority over both the management of that cli-
ent's discretionary account and the investment advisor who had
direct control over the account. 17' Because of this relationship,
the court "believe[d] at the very least that fiduciaries have acted
with scienter when they have been reckless. . . ,,.7 In a like
manner, recklessness would seem to be a proper standard by
which to examine the conduct of a bank that finances the hostile
takeover of a customer.18 0
If an offeror-borrower knows that the bank's decision to grant
a tender offer loan is based primarily on favorable nonpublic in-
formation about the target, and a particular range of bid prices to
176. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
177. 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
178. Id at 44.
179. Id at 47.
180. For discussion of the special or fiduciary relationship between a bank and its cor-
porate loan customer, see text accompanying notes 24-37 supra.
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be offered has been set by the bank as a condition of the loan, or if
the loan was applied for and granted upon the knowledge that a
particular bid price range will be offered, the bank should be
aware that it is aiding in a decision of the offeror management.
Without doubt, the bank would appreciate the confidentiality of
the target's information because of the manner in which it was
initially received from the target. Similarly, the materiality of
earnings projections is unquestioned and was certainly material to
the bank in establishing its loan relationship with the target.
Just as certainly, the offeror would know that the bank will
only lend when it believes that the probability of repayment is
high. When the offeror is aware that the loan has been preceded
by an analysis of whether an acquisition at the specified price
range will benefit or detract from the offeror's ability to repay af-
ter the acquisition, the offeror may reasonably conclude that the
bank's analysis has yielded a favorable judgment. Likewise, when
the bank is aware of the offeror's knowledge of the bank's deci-
sionmaking process it must also be aware that its conclusion con-
stitutes a recommendation to proceed with the takeover, if not a
transfer of the analysis itself. Thus, the bank's knowledge that the
analysis contains material nonpublic information may constitute
its requisite scienter. In the same manner, the offeror's knowledge
of the interaction establishes its awareness that it now possesses
nonpublic information, and its scienter is thereby provided as
well.18 1
The difficulty of showing actual intent to disclose information
selectively or to make a recommendation in a situation such as
this is precisely the reason for the adoption of recklessness as a
standard of scienter.
[A] basis for applying a recklessness standard in certain in-
stances rests perhaps on the practical problem of proof in pri-
vate enforcement under the securities laws. Proof of a
defendant's knowledge or intent will often be inferential.... To
require in all types of 1Ob-5 cases that a factfinder must find a
specific intent to deceive or defraud would for all intents and
purposes disembowel the private cause of action under
§10(b).' 82
Both the revelation and the intent are inferred in the hostile
tender offer loan. Since the antifraud provisions are intended to
181. See note 127 supra.




have flexible application,183 the adoption of a recklessness stan-
dard promotes the purpose of regulating deceptive practices.
In summary, although no court has addressed the validity of a
claim brought under the federal securities law antifraud provi-
sions in the context of a bank financing the hostile takeover of a
corporate client, such a claim may be an appropriate basis for in-
junctive relief. The nonpublic information which is possessed by
the bank, through the interaction of the bank and the offeror in
setting the range of per share offering prices, may be shown to be
both material to the offeror and an element of the offeror's deci-
sion to purchase the shares of the target. The knowledge of this
interaction by these two parties seems to constitute the requisite
scienter for a private action for injunctive relief. Because the tar-
get wishes to prevent its takeover from occurring, it will seek to
thwart the tender offer before any purchase has, been consum-
mated and will, therefore, have standing to sue for injunctive re-
lief in the federal courts under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF A "CHINESE WALL"
When considering a loan to be used for the hostile takeover of
a corporate borrower, a bank should anticipate the possibility of
litigation initiated by the target. The appearance of a conflict of
interest will be readily seized upon to bring the matter before the
courts and to suspend temporarily the offer. On close scrutiny, the
contention that a per se breach occurs upon the establishment of a
lending agreement with the offeror lacks legal foundation and is
commercially unreasonable." 4 However, the claim that a bank
has actually used confidential information supplied by the target
in making the tender offer loan evaluation deserves more serious
consideration.
Because of the strong case which can be made for bank liabil-
ity, a wise lender will avoid the use of the target's confidential
information. Yet, even a cautious approach may not prevent the
filing of a lawsuit. The difficult burden of proof which confronts a
target in showing actual use, and the potential for that use when
information on the loan accounts of both target and offeror is con-
tained in the same department of the bank, may present a prime
case for the imposition of imputed knowledge or use.' 8
5
183. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
184. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
185. This argument was made in Washington Steel. Brief of Apellee at 33-48, 602 F.2d
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A possible solution to this form of bank vulnerability may be
found in erecting a "Chinese Wall" between loan accounts. Al-
though normally offered as a mechanism to prevent the flow of
inside information between trust and commerical loan depart-
ments of a bank, the characteristics of a "wall" seem applicable to
divisions within the loan department as well.'" 6 The basic ele-
ments of a wall would be common in both applications. In gen-
eral, it is necessary only to establish procedures which are
designed to prevent access to confidential materials by anyone
other than those bank officers directly concerned with a particular
client or transaction, and to publish conspicuously these safeguard
procedures. 187
The existence of such safeguard procedures in the loan divi-
sions of a bank could operate as a rebuttable presumption that no
disclosure had occurred. If adequate intradepartmental policies
existed, a target corporation would have to make a clear showing
of the misuse of its confidential information to warrant injunctive
relief. This procedural mechanism would alleviate the fear and
criticism of a new anti-takeover strategy based upon indirect dis-
closure of nonpublic information as violations of fiduciary or fed-
eral securities law. Alternatively, the absence of such internal
safeguards could be deemed to be a presumption of illegal use.
Federal administrators have indicated a willingness to extend
the Chinese Wall beyond its present use in preventing information
flow between trust and lending departments of a bank.188  One
594 (3d Cir. 1979). See Mendez-Penate, supra note 97, at 687-88. The contention is partic-
ularly valid when there is significant incentive for use by the bank. See text accompanying
notes 108-11 supra.
186. Herzel & Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 679-83. See generaly Bruzda & Seidel,
Bank Trust Departments and the 10b-5 Dilemma, 21 VILL. L. REv. 367 (1976); Herman &
Safanda, The CommericalBank Trust Department, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv., 21 (1972);
Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73
(1978); Huck, The Fatal Lure of the Impermeable Chinese Wall, 94 BANKING L.J. 100
(1977); Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions, and the Separation of Trust
and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611 (1977).
Not everyone who has considered this issue agrees, however. For discussions on the
inapplicability of a "Chinese Wall" to all situations, see Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Fund of Funds v. Arthur Anderson Co.,
567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (1974).
187. For specific recommendations on the proper internal procedures to be imple-
mented to guard against liability, see Herzel & Coiling, note 186 supra, and Herzel &
Rosenberg, note I supra.
188. Both then Federal Reserve Board Chairman G. William Miller and Comptroller
of the Currency John G. Heimman indicated in letters to Henry Reuss, Chairman of the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, that potential conflicts of inter-
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federal court has also impliedly recognized the value of a wall in
isolating more than the trust department.' 89 The Securities and
Exchange Commission, in recently adopted rule changes, has also
endorsed the application of the Chinese Wall theory to divisions
within a multiservice financial institution.' 90
Even without such a wall, a bank may be able to show ade-
quately that, under general procedures, it does not inquire into the
status of one borrower when evaluating a loan to another cus-
tomer, and, in the particular loan being questioned, there was not
sufficient incentive to justify a presumption of use. In response to
a Rule lOb-5 claim, it may also be able to show that most or all of
the information it received from the target was publicly available
through stockholder reports, investment services, and other non-
confidential sources. 191 Finally, it may demonstrate that the infor-
mation on which it based its loan determination would not be
material to an investor contemplating the purchase or sale of the
target's stock.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has presented an analysis of the potential liability of
a bank which chooses to finance the hostile takeover of a corpo-
rate borrower. It should be apparent that even though a lawsuit
which challenges the propriety of such action may be ultimately
fruitless, sufficient legal arguments can be made to bring the con-
troversy before the courts. In view of this very real possibility,
Judge Gibbon's fear that capital funding may be curtailed is a
est should be avoided. However, application of present federal statutory provisions to the
indirect disclosure problem would turn on the definition of what constitutes "recom-
mending" the sale or purchase of securities. See Legal Times of Washington, supra note
13.
189. The court in Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis.
1979), recognized the function of a Chinese Wall in finding that no misuse of confidential
information had occurred by the fact that a wall had been constructed and was established
bank policy.
190. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17120,20 SEC DOCKET 1241 (Sept. 16, 1980); See
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16385, 18 SEC DOCKET 1092 (Nov. 29, 1979).
The internal isolation of material, non-public information (the so-called "Chinese
Wall") is generally the approach taken in proposed Rule 14e-3(b). Under the
proposal, conduct by a person other than a natural person which would, but for
[the existence of a wall], violate proposed Rule 14e-3(a), would be deemed nonvi-
olative if the [institution] can show that the individuals did not know and did not
have access to material non-public information ....
Id at 1100.
191. Herzel and Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 678-81.
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valid concern. 192 The only solution appears to be legislative ac-
tion on both the state and federal levels which would attempt to
sort out the myriad interests and conflicts involved. From its per-
spective, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently
begun to tackle this problem by proposing legislation which will
enable it to regulate the use of confidential information by a bank
in these circumstances. Other governmental bodies should be en-
couraged to follow its lead. 93
PAUL R. LOVEJOY
192. See text accompanying notes 43-54 supra.
193. See Williams Letter, supra note 107. In its proposed changes of the federal securi-
ties laws, the SEC does not advocate legislation which would impose an absolute prohibi-
tion on banks financing tender offers for corporate loan customers. Rather, the
Commission asserts that a bidder should be required to disclose the identity of its tender if
the bank faces a potential conflict of interest because of its prior or present commercial
relationship with the target. Id at 10.
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